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Responses to the Eurozone crisis are having an impact on welfare reform across Europe.
Aidan Regan argues that the current focus on austerity has reduced the ability of states to
pursue egalitarian policies and reflects a general movement toward neoliberalism at the
European level.
Across Europe, the welfare state is subject to continued reform. But this begs the question: in
what direction and in whose interest? This question has become particularly acute for
countries in the Eurozone, a democratic experiment in multilevel governance that is now in
crisis. The economic shock has been felt differently in member-states, all of which have
different welfare traditions. This has exposed new structural fault lines in the common currency area,
particularly between the north and south of Europe. Given the absence of exchange rate adjustments, the
entire focus of adjustment must fall on fiscal, wage and labour market policy. This focus on austerity
decreases the capacity of the democratic sovereign state to adopt an egalitarian response to the crisis, or
one based on solidarity.
The fiscal adjustment being proposed to deal with the Eurozone crisis is neoliberal in orientation, with a broad
focus on structural reforms and spending cuts. This has obvious implications for the public sector. The policy
focus of the Lisbon agenda from 2000 was concerned with balancing social security and labour market
flexibility. This focus on ‘flexicurity’ or ‘productive social policy’ was informed by different variants of ‘third way’
social democracy, centred on competing versions of the state. The Lisbon agenda has now given way to de-
regulation of the labour market as a means to promote economic and employment performance. But how has
this shift from human capital investment to neoliberalism in European social policy taken place, and does it
have an impact on the national labour market reform strategy in each member-state?
The gradual shift to neoliberalism at a transnational European level was a political practice that began with the
institutionalisation of the single European act in 1992, establishing the Single Market. The era since then has
been marked by the opening up of finance markets, increased temporary and precarious employment,
tightened eligibility for social protection, more corporate takeovers, privatised public services, weakened trade
unions and greater income inequality. This has been a general process across Europe but it does not mean
that neoliberalism manifested itself in the same way in each country. It is mediated by country specific
electoral and political regimes, particularly the organisation of industrial relations, social protection and wage
setting institutions.
Across Europe we can identify distinct trajectories of liberalisation, conditioned by national political coalitions
in each member state. In Germany there has been an increased dualisation of the labour market, creating
political tension between ‘insiders and outsiders’. In the Netherlands and Denmark there has been an
increase in part time employment and flexibility, but also a generalised social safety net to ensure income
replacement. In the UK, there has been a gradual de-regulation of the labour market and active promotion of
low wage employment. In Spain and Italy, the trajectory of change has deepened the division between labour
market insiders and outsiders. Very few countries adopted the social investment or ‘flexicurity’ regime. Given
the reliance on coordinated social policies, it was only applicable to the developed welfare states of Northern
Europe, and even here it required constructing new political coalitions capable of significant institutional
reform.
The social investment approach that emerged in pre-crisis Europe was an attempt by some member-states
(primarily small open Nordic and Alpine economies with a tradition of social corporatism to compensate
global market risk) to manage the political constraints of neoliberalism, many of whom chose not to enter the
currency union. Governments shifted social policy away from de-commodification toward supplying the
market with human capital, with active support from trade unions. This led to a renewed focus on active
labour market policies, skill formation and training. These ‘supply side’ policies were promoted as new
variants of social democracy, and made possible by maintaining a high tax-GDP ratio. But it is highly
questionable whether the ‘flexicurity’ approach to social and employment policy actually leads to egalitarian
outcomes, even if it improves economic and employment performance.
The general point is that models of egalitarian capitalism are determined at the national not the European
level. Furthermore, a social investment strategy can only be pursued by national governments in a period of
economic growth, with a secure form of tax revenue. We are now facing a fiscal crisis of the nation-state,
brought about by the reckless behavior of private finance markets and low tax regimes that decreases the
capacity of the state to be re-distributive. This problem is exacerbated by the monetary constraints of the
EMU, which have made national welfare states more fragile, given that the adjustment cannot be externalised.
The question, therefore, is whether an egalitarian response to the crisis can be carved out at a transnational
European level. The empirical evidence seems to suggest otherwise, which is reflected in the terms and
conditions of the ‘Euro plus pact’ adopted by member-states in March 2011, and the fiscal compact of March
2012.
These reflect a crisis of the democratic sovereign state to reconcile the distributional tension that emerges
from Europeanisation, a process which has removed many of the traditional policy tools available to
governments to deal with economic crises. The political conditions for a ‘Social Europe’ do not exist, given the
massive diversity in welfare state traditions across the European Union, and a general policy preference for
competing tax regimes. There is growing support for populist parties across Europe, who increasingly equate
increased European integration with more neoliberalism and the erosion of national sovereignty. Examining
the policy responses to the crisis at the European level, this is not without good reason. But it should not be
assumed that Europe is incapable of a more solidaristic approach. The ‘beggar thy neighbour’ approach, in
which one country’s response to the crisis may exacerbate problems in neighbouring countries, is primarily a
reflection of national governments responding to domestic electoral interests. Policy choices are political and
non-deterministic.
The main actor in Europe in the ‘aftershock’ of the crisis is Germany. The conservative CDU coalition, with
support from center-right governments across Europe, the ECB and the European Commission, have clearly
opted to prioritise economic orthodoxy to deal with structural problems in the Euro area. They insist upon
wage restraint to increase competitiveness, de-regulated labour markets to enhance employment, tougher
fiscal rules to ensure balanced budgets and structural reforms to promote economic growth in creditor
countries. The adjustment strategy does not propose learning from the policy regimes underpinning the
organised model of capitalism that has made German, Nordic and Alpine export economies so successful.
Nor does it propose tackling the deeper structural imbalances between the north and south of the Eurozone
through issuing Eurobonds or fiscal transfers. It has exacerbated the trade imbalances between different
regions of Europe.
At the European level monetarism reigns supreme as the dominant macro-economic policy paradigm, with
the political implication that national social policy reforms are neoliberal in orientation. Decision making is
increasingly handed over to economic technocrats, within a complex multi-level governance system that
prioritises market integration over social integration. The role of the state in this context is to ensure balanced
budgets through the implementation of austerity impose structural reforms in the labour market, increase the
eligibility criteria for income transfers, and in some countries, to act as a debt collection agency on behalf of
financial markets. In this regard, the transnational adjustment to the Eurozone crisis is certainly coordinated
but it is Hayekian rather than Polanyian in design.  This does not bode well for the future of egalitarian
capitalism and seriously calls into question the future of ‘Social Europe’.
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Related posts:
1. The consequences of a Euro collapse for both the Eurozone’s core and periphery are so dramatic, and
their ramifications so uncertain, that all efforts should be made to shore up the European Monetary
Union.
2. Europe’s prosperity is not to be built via political declarations and never-ending summits. Promoting
free, fair and open international trade and removing the remaining barriers to an effective single market
in Europe are key for future growth
3. The political and economic crisis in Europe has meant a step back for the EU’s major institutions.
Solutions in 2012 must not come at the expense of democracy.
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